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Abstract
The present study shows that the protection of civilians (POC) tasks implemented in
multiple United Nations (UN) peace operations have not always been executed as intended and,
as a result, are accompanied by a number of dysfunctions. Among these dysfunctions are
inadequate community engagement, peacekeeper misconduct stemming from the lack of proper
training mechanisms, and lack of resources. In consideration of these issues, UN peace
operations would profoundly benefit from enhancements offering plausible and beneficial
change to the field. Such changes involve the responsibility of the UN, the responsibility of
national actors, field implementations, and the psychological well-being of peacekeepers. More
importantly, peace operations training needs to be properly implemented and completed to
mitigate under-preparedness. This analysis relies primarily on scholarly articles, UN documents,
and news reports. It is supplemented by interviews with present and former UN peace operations
personnel and other relevant UN staff members posted in the field and at headquarters that offer
a firsthand account on the subject area.
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List of Terms and Abbreviations
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C-34
DFS
DPO
DPKO
DRC
IHRL
IOT
ITS
MINUSMA
MONUC
MONUSCO
NGOs
OIOS
OIOS-IED
POC
QIPs
SEA
SML
STMs
TCCs
UN
UNAMID
UNAMSIL
UNHQ
UNMISS
UNMIL
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United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Nongovernmental Organizations
Office of Internal Oversight Services
Office of Internal Oversight Inspection and Evaluation Division
Protection of Civilians
Quick Impact Projects
Sexual Exploitation and Assault
Senior Mission Leader
Specialized Training Material
Troop-Contributing Countries
United Nations
United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
United Nations Headquarters
United Nations Mission in South Sudan
United Nations Mission in Liberia
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Chapter 1: Introduction
I. The Evolution of the Protection of Civilians
It is widely recognized that there is a significant gap between POC mandates and their
application in the field. As 1992 marked the beginning of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO), now known as the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) [while
peacekeeping began in 1948, the Department was not created until 1992], the protection of
civilians mandate was an unknown notion. In the early and mid-1990s, there were a growing
number of multiple but ineffective attempts to protect civilians, notably the missions in Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia. It was not until later in 1999 in the Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL) that the UN deployed peacekeeping forces with the mandate to use force in order to
protect civilians. The step was taken amid considerable debate over UNAMSIL as the opponents
to the POC objective preferred dealing with the situation through the mechanisms of Chapter VI
rather than the forceful means of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.1
Despite all of the controversies over the response to the situation in Sierra Leone, the
decision marked a definitive start to the history of the protection of civilians in UN peace
operations. Unfortunately, subsequent statements from the Security Council often lacked clarity
as they reasserted the importance of POC while neglecting to go into detail about its
operationalization. This caused the POC mandates to be tossed around freely while lending
themselves to diversified interpretations and resulting in meaningless implementations for nearly
a decade. These ambiguous statements from the Security Council as well as the silence within
reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) contributed to failures in
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POC, especially the case in the DRC.2 In response, the Security Council began to explicitly
mandate POC in missions such as the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (MONUC), the UN Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL), and the UN Missions in the Central African Republic and Chad.3 In addition to
receiving more recognition in the Security Council, in 2009, the C-34 also devoted more
attention to the mandate and started to use language that specifically referred to the protection of
civilians in its annual reports. They continued to use this type of language in each annual report
to follow. Not only was POC discussed with more clarity, but additional measures were also
being taken by the DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) to better implement the
mandate by such means as studies on mandate implementation, developing training materials for
peacekeeping troops, and coordinating with the Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs. 4
As the years passed, the Security Council has sharpened its focus on the protection of
civilians in armed conflicts. Thus, in March 2011, the Council responded to the conflict in Libya
with the injunction to protect civilians using all means necessary. Although this directive utilized
POC language, it was done under the Responsibility to Protect, mostly because of the focus on
the operational level as well as on a broader strategic basis. The UN peacekeeping order would
have been exclusively a POC mandate if the focus was solely on the operational level use of
force with host-state consent (which was not given by Libya). Because this intervention ended in
a fallout, there was concern that it would result in the loss of ongoing support for the POC
mandate. International Relations scholars Haidi Wilmot and Scott Sheeran have observed that the
Libya intervention has had a negative impact on some Security Council members’ willingness to
2
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support interventions. This can be seen when responding to the conflict in Syria. Despite this
reluctance, the Libya intervention was followed by new implementations regarding the
protection of civilians by the Security Council.5 Two years after the intervention, in March 2013,
the Security Council authorized the Intervention Brigade to be deployed in eastern Congo as part
of MONUSCO.6 This authorization brought up the subject of whether or not POC can be
achieved through preemptive offensive operations, as the order entailed the brigade to use
necessary force to protect civilians under the imminent threat of violence.7
The concept of protection of civilians in UN peace operations gained further momentum
when the Obama administration organized a peacekeeping meeting in 2014 that eventually
evolved into a Peacekeeping Summit in 2015. One of the key purposes of the summit was to
encourage Member States to give more support to POC in peacekeeping mandates and missions.
A few months before the Peacekeeping Summit was held, Rwanda hosted the High-Level
International Conference on the Protection of Civilians which led to the adoption of the Kigali
Principles, a set of non-binding pledges for giving effect to the protection of civilians in UN
peace operations.8 These principles were discussed at the 2015 Peacekeeping Summit, turning
countries’ reluctance towards POC that stemmed from previous failures into willingness and
commitment to protect.9 The Security Council has unquestionably (albeit slowly) begun to
effectively recognize the protection of civilians over time in increasingly operational terms. A
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major outstanding question that remains unaddressed relates to the training of UN
peacekeeping.10
I argue that, although the UN has made improvements regarding its attention to POC,
there is a dire need for enhanced peacekeeper training in multiple aspects. First, I state that the
Security Council has lacked the proper operationalization and prioritization of POC. Second, I
explain that national actors have neglected certain aspects of training. Third, I argue that peace
operations do not properly supplement their pre-deployment training with field implementation.
Finally, I assert that peacekeepers are not properly equipped with the tools to achieve and
maintain a state of psychological well-being. These issues stem from factors such as the lack of
clear POC guidelines, incomplete mandatory training material, the lack of resources, ineffective
community engagement training, poor design and delivery of training, and the lack of concern
for peacekeepers’ psychological well-being.

10

Thomas F. Copeland, “Civilian Protection in the Eastern DRC: Evaluation of the MONUSCO Peacekeeping
Operation.”

8
Chapter 2: Literature Review
It is no secret that the DPO has faced many challenges in effectively protecting civilians,
especially when it comes to the mission in the DRC, and there is a large body of literature
approaching this predicament. Thomas F. Copeland measures the effectiveness of the protection
of civilians at MONUSCO by utilizing three metrics: rates of internally displaced persons, rates
of civilian massacres, and incidents of sexual violence. He recognizes that civilian protection
lacks a clear definition as well as a universal definition. This has gained scholarly responses,
giving clear definitions of civilian protection from authors who study the subject. While authors
are publishing clear definitions of POC, the field is ironically witnessing disparities between
these renditions. For example, the protection of civilians is defined by Copeland as:
“...the prevention of civilian massacres, internal displacement, and systematic or recurring
sexual violence in accordance with broader principles established in the Geneva
Conventions and International Humanitarian Law.”11
On the other hand, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee defines protection as:
“...all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in
accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. International
Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law, International Refugee law
(IRL).”12
As it can be seen, just these two definitions take on different approaches to POC. Copeland
concentrates on the prevention of harm to civilians while the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
focuses on fully respecting the rights of civilians. Of course, there are similarities between the
two, and it can be argued that these are the same definitions put differently, however, one can see
how this can lead to confusion.
In order to produce a sound evaluation of civilian protection in the mission in the DRC,
Julie Reynaert conducted interviews with MONUC staff and the Congolese civil society. She
11
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acknowledges that there has been some success with the protection of civilians between 2005
and 2007 in the DRC, however, Reynaert finds that there is still a challenge in effective
communication between civilians and peacekeepers. She learns that, in order to ameliorate this
challenge, the key lies within the actions of the Congolese government. More specifically, the
interviews addressed five major challenges that include communication and strategy challenges,
the lack of preparedness and willingness of peacekeepers, external challenges, and the
partnership between the UN and the Congolese government. She asserts that the DPKO
possesses a “capability gap” when it comes to being able to fully and effectively implement
resources and training. In addressing the UN’s overall shifting attitude towards the protection of
civilians, Reynaert gathers that the UN has taken a reactive stance on the issue, considering that
it has been and is still a sensitive topic. There is a hovering fear amongst UN officials to bring up
the use of force even in the case of protecting civilians in fear of offending the peace process.
She finds that, although there are unclear guidelines put into place, there is no formal training
covering these guidelines, nor is there any effective method of monitoring and evaluating the
carrying out of these guidelines.13
The protection of civilians has also remained a major challenge in South Sudan, so much
so that Hilde Frafjord Johnson, a Special Representative and Head of Mission at UNMISS,
published work on the subject calling for the reform of UN peace operations. Multiple POC
enhancement measures were implemented during her term, which she completed in 2014.
Johnson states that while many of these measures were not effective in Juba’s formal institutions,
some progress was made locally. Regardless, UNMISS continues to struggle with effectively
protecting civilians, prompting Johnson to suggest a better selection of mission leadership, a

13
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different approach to the POC mandate, and the enhancement of resources.14 The issue of
inadequate resources in South Sudan is also addressed by Jenna Stern. Stern identifies challenges
within POC sites at UNMISS, and in doing so, calls out the lack of funds provided in order to
protect civilians. The funding problem is so significant that she illustrates its negative impact on
the UN’s ability to protect civilians by describing accounts of aid given by independent groups in
lieu of the UN’s impotence. Some examples include how NGOs have tried to help in ways such
as donating solar lamps to sites in order to make it safer for women to do things like use the
bathroom after dark.15 More importantly, Johnson stresses the need for security sector reform and
investment in peacekeeper training. This should be a serious concern of the Security Council
because in order for success, different security actors must act in coherence with one another.
One notable challenge mentioned is the means and ability to create a protective environment
where futile security services and violence are so prominent. She also addresses the capability
gap and the issue of the ill-defined protection of civilians mandate, which we have outlined in
earlier sections.16
Finally, the UN mission in Mali has further attracted the attention of the international
community in regards to POC shortcomings. The Stimson Center, to start, has discussed
challenges that add to civilian threats including security presence and prioritization of the POC
mandate.17 After the massacre in Ogossagau in 2019, the Security Council passed Resolution
2480 which shifted the prioritization of POC to aid in its implementation.18 Following the
strategic priority of MINUSMA to support implementations regarding the coordination of armed
14
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groups and government agreements, Resolution 2480 enacted the second strategic priority of
MINUSMA “to facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive politically-led Malian strategy
to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence, and re-establish State authority.”19 This,
however, did not prevent a second attack in the same area about a year later.
A crucial setback in this situation in Mali is the lack of direct support to and
communication with Malian armed forces. Fostering a positive working relationship with the
host state and making civilian safety a priority go hand in hand.20 Namie Di Razza also draws
attention to the need to prioritize the protection of civilians in response to the massacre in Mali.
Razza specifically looks into Security Council Resolution 2423 and argues that the protection of
civilians should be prioritized politically and militarily. Razza also confronts the fact that POC is
not prioritized in MINUSMA’s mandate, and rather, the neutralizing of terrorist threats and the
safety of peacekeepers is prioritized.21
A striking characteristic of these critiques is the relative lack of attention to the training
of peacekeepers. In fact, the matter is sometimes brought up to satisfy the public eye, but later
brushed under the rug with little to no action. For example, in a 2009 independent study
commissioned by the DPKO and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Victoria Holt, Glyn Taylor, and Max Kelly provide specific recommendations to improve POC in
peace operations. One recommendation urges the establishment of educational teams to explain
training to Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs), and that Force Commanders are given
mission-specific pre-deployment training.22 While expressing concern in these areas is a step in
19
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the right direction, an implementation and review of these recommendations remains to be
found. Evidently, the UN is aware of these pressing matters, but does not hold enough
importance in POC and peacekeeper training to devote the adequate amount of time and
resources into the endeavor. Moreover, the subject of training is not an easy one to address, as it
is highly decentralized, and is the prime responsibility of TCCs. Their troop contribution varies
considerably, and this has an impact on the quality of troops and the resources that are deployed.
Their contributions to peace operations vary considerably and this has Walter A. Dorn and
Joshua Libben explore the myths related to peacekeeping training and make recommendations
for enhancement. They believe that peacekeeping training needs to involve tactics and education
outside of the use of force.23
While there is not much literature on peacekeeper training and the protection of civilians,
there is even less material regarding the mental health of peacekeepers. The earliest mention of
the issue appears in a 1993 resolution of the Security Council. In the language of Resolution
47/226 :
“Take note of the comments in the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the
respect for the privileges and immunities of officials of the United Nations and the
specialized agencies and related organizations...on how best to assist and rehabilitate staff
members dealing with the after-effects of traumatic and stressful security-related
experiences, and looks forward to receiving further information thereon at its forty-ninth
session;”24

While this resolution was passed 28 years ago, it has been the only real mention of psychological
well-being among troops, and even then, was soon forgotten about by the UN. This matter was
also neglected by the majority of outsiders in the International Relations field, as there is no

23
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substantial information to be found in this regard. It was not until 1998 that Brian Kidwell and
Harvey J. Langholtz confronted peacekeeper personal and psychological preparation, especially
when it comes to stress management. They highlight the fact that peacekeepers are prone to a
variety of negative emotional and physical reactions associated with stress such as loss of
motivation, sleepiness, false guilt due to the inability to control events, a sense of powerlessness,
substance abuse, and depression. Peacekeepers are not taught how to properly cope with these
reactions, or even that these reactions are likely to occur.25
Kidwell and Langholtz outline three main areas in which stressors can affect staff
members: organizational stress, job stress, and critical incident stress.26 In a more recent
publication, Namie Di Razza similarly identifies three main stressors that contribute to the rather
high rates of mental health issues among peacekeepers: the UN’s bureaucracy, the environment
in which peacekeepers operate, and the nature of peacekeepers’ work. Razza’s three stressors
lie parallel to those of Kidlwell and Langholtz as one can find evident links connecting one
author’s view to the other’s, which makes it evident that the psychological well-being of
peacekeepers has been a long-standing problem. More disheartening is the fact that these two
pieces of literature stand 22 years apart, yet, they both confront the same issue. This raises the
question: how has such a crucial issue that affects both peacekeepers and civilians been
neglected for over two decades? Razza explains that some reasons for this include the negative
stigma around mental health, the division of responsibilities between actors, and different
cultural approaches among countries. Razza seems to be the only one in today’s international
community that is actively confronting this long-standing dilemma.

25
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After reviewing these pieces of literature and observing the evolution of POC, we have
briefly noted factors that denote serious training weaknesses in peace operations. We must
address this factor of peacekeeping training head on in order to ameliorate the shortcomings
previously discussed. Marco Jowell analyzes the effects of the Peace Support Training Centre in
Kenya on African Union peace operations, and finds that a positive aspect to peacekeeping
training (other than what is gained from training material) is the vast opportunity for
socialization and networking among African militaries. 27 The importance of the opportunity for
networking is also found as a success of peacekeeping training from a 2015 Office of Internal
Oversight Services (OIOS) report on senior leadership. Senior leaders, however, expressed the
need for more of these opportunities.28 Jowell not only examines the types and quality of courses
offered, but he also analyses the delivery of these courses. He argues that the delivery of the
training is flawed and that the course material is not determined by the appropriate personnel.
Jowell also argues that training staff are underqualified and student selection is dysfunctional.29
Peacekeeping training needs to effectively involve a focus on gender training, and Minna
Lyytikäinen specifically addresses this issue. One thing that is quite admirable of this source is
that Lyytikäinen looks at women, as well as men, and victims as well as perpetrators. She does
her best to bring a very unbiased approach to this topic and finds that, because people in host
countries have come to accept it over the years, the challenge of sexual abuse has been getting
harder to tackle. In response to the challenge of gender issues in host countries, Lyytikäinen
brings up the Nambia Plan of Action and the Security Council Resolution 1325. While these
responses were made by the UN, they took place in 2000, which as we can see from the passing
27
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of time, did not solve the problem. Lyytikäinen outlines three concrete efforts that were taken by
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but unfortunately, does not go in depth about
their effectiveness. She argues that in order to work at alleviating this problem, there should be a
focus on peacekeeper training.30

30
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Chapter 3: Methodology
In reviewing the above literature, it can be said that the surface has only been scratched in
regards to identifying issues within peacekeeping and proposing actions for improvement. Areas
such as sexual assault by peacekeepers, poor implementation of POC mandates, lack of
peacekeeper preparedness, and lack of resources have been identified, however, the current
literature overlooks areas such as training completion, gender parity among peacekeepers, the
psychological well-being of peacekeepers, and cultural and language training. Moreover, while
some of these factors, such as the lack of resources and psychological well-being of
peacekeepers, are discussed among the international community, they are not all addressed head
on and with effective remedial action. Structured around five chapters, the present study strives
to supply the proverbial shovel for one to dig deeper into these issues. The first three chapters
provide an introduction to the topic and argument (what argument? Policy recommendations are
not an argument), consisting of the methodology of this thesis, a summary of the evolution of
POC, and reviews the literature review that observes multiple peace operations as well as
published texts on POC and training. The fourth chapter provides an overview of the problems
arising from inadequate peacekeeping training. And finally, the fifth chapter contributes
recommendations for the enhancement of POC by utilizing unique insights on challenges and
suggestions through the interviews conducted for this thesis as well as other material analyzed in
the previous chapters, and summarizes this study’s findings.
The study relies on a wide array of sources. The development, evolution and
effectiveness of the protection of civilians norm in UN peace operations is documented by
scholarly articles, news reports, UN General Assembly meeting reports, and OIOS reports.
Secondly, and more importantly, I have conducted a set of interviews during the months of May

17
and June of 2021 to gain a unique and new perspective on the topic. Interviewees were contacted
through email by way of reference, or through business social media. This study consists of a
total of five video conference interviews as well as one email interview. Participants include
three DPO Political Affairs Officers, one DPO Communications and Public Information Officer,
one former UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Senior Gender Advisor, and one
Director and Chief Trainer for government programmes. Despite the modest number of
interviews owing to time and resource constraints, these positions allow for a variety of
perspectives to be taken into account, also as they encompass views on peacekeeping
implementation both in the field and at UN headquarters (UNHQ). Interviewees were
questioned about the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping training, the mandate and
implementation of the protection of civilians, the atmosphere between locals and peacekeepers,
and policy and human rights violations. They have also been asked to give their opinion on the
implementation of mental health professionals in the field in order to better the psychological
well-being of peacekeepers while, in turn, improving the protection of civilians. The complete
list of interview questions and details about interviewees can be found in the annex of this paper.
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Chapter 4: The Training Issue
I. Complications Uncovered in Training
As a means of training peacekeepers across the globe, the DPKO has developed a set of
guidelines, known as Specialized Training Materials (STMs). Last updated in 2019 they are
intended to provide all troops with common training principles during pre-deployment. STMs
include scenario-based exercises, informational lectures, and small learning activities. Some of
the lessons include topics such as the concept of support, peacekeeping intelligence, safety and
security, legal frameworks, investigation and interviewing techniques, liaison and coordination,
negotiation and mediation, weapon recognition, disarmament, and reporting procedures.31
According to the UN website, the protection of civilians is a relevant aspect that the STM
mainstreams. However, a reading of the UN STM Core Business of UN Police and its Key
Partners suggests that POC is not a priority. The protection of civilians is only discussed once,
and is not mentioned until page ten. The focus of the training dwells on reform, law enforcement,
disarmament, electoral assistance, and civilian cooperation. These factors are indeed important
and essential to peace operations, however, they are not nearly sufficient. This is not meant to
invalidate the current training material, but instead, to bring to light an important factor that is
missing.32
Not only does the material that makes up peacekeeping training need to be reconsidered,
but its design and delivery should also be taken into consideration for reform. Of particular
relevance here is a 2015 OIOS audit report which evaluated the senior leadership training of the
DPKO and the DFS. Through interviews with senior leadership, the report found that leaders
experienced problems due to the design and the delivery of training material. Most training
31
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implemented was generic and supply-driven, and often did not tackle the specific training needs
of senior staff. On top of this, the proper amount of time and resources was often not supplied to
trainers. The report provides that for 2014-15 senior mission leader (SML) training, about
$775,000 and five staff members were provided by the DPKO/DFS. This funding was selective
as it only covered factors such as SML and Senior Leadership Programme travel costs for staff,
mentors, and facilitators. All other needs, making up 84.6% of the training budget used, relied on
extra-budgetary aid or pro bono support.33
Additionally, the same OIOS report uncovered that over one third of senior leaders had
not completed the required training. At the Director Level 2 (senior field managers) and above,
only 61.8% of leaders had completed the mandatory Senior Leadership Programme. More
unsettling, 28.4% of leaders at the time had not completed any of the required training set by the
DPKO/DFS. Reasons that are given for the lack of training completion is just as unnerving. ⅓ of
interviewed peacekeepers reported not being invited to the required training. Time constraints
and the inability to travel to training sites in New York were also common reasons cited. These,
along with senior leaders’ reports of no compulsion to complete training and no obvious sanction
to those who did not complete training, should attract immediate attention and induce remedial
action.34
Finally, the psychological well-being of peacekeepers is often not taken into
consideration, leading to emotional fatigue and exhaustion reported by the OIOS, and eventually,
policy and human rights violations. Not only is their current psychological wellness not taken
into consideration, but so is their potential psychological wellness. Peacekeepers are put in high
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stress situations, and the DPKO/DFS training fails to take into account the mental health of those
put in the field. In addition to the lack of direct mental health consideration, peacekeepers
reported that under-preparedness was a cause to feelings of disconnect and increasing stress. The
lack of networking (due to inadequate training) has caused peacekeepers to feel like complete
outsiders. Under-preparedness of peacekeepers has also resulted in painful situations where
leaders did not know how to properly execute directives. Not to mention the amount of
self-learning that had to be done after working long 12-13 hour days because the necessary
material was not provided in training.35
II. Steps Towards Improvement
The OIOS has recognized these issues, and made recommendations to enhance
peacekeeping training. These, however, did not adequately deal with the apparent lack of the
psychological well-being of peacekeepers, an effective design and delivery method, and
sufficient resources. In order to evaluate the implementation of the recommendations made as a
result of the 2015 audit, the Inspection and Evaluation Division of the OIOS (OIOS-IED)
conducted a triennial review and published their report in October of 2019. The language used
within the report refers to recommendations that will no longer be looked into and worked on as
closed, and recommendations that have been carried out as implemented. The report claims that
five of the recommendations have been implemented, leaving one recommendation to be
partially implemented and another to be closed without implementation. As shall be seen, these
claims, however, may not be as cut-and-dry as they appear to be.36
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In the evaluation of the first recommendation which calls for the development and
implementation of a comprehensive senior leadership training strategy, the OIOS-IED reports
that the Integrated Training Service (ITS) developed a system-wide training plan. This plan
creates specific training from recruitment to in-mission deployment. Additionally, the Leadership
Support Section is reported to have internally adopted a life-cycle approach with the intention of
supporting leaders from recruitment to post-deployment. This, and a mentoring programme that
is currently on hold due to lack of funds, is all that is provided for this recommendation’s
implementation. The report does admit that a comprehensive, formal, and overarching strategy
still needs to be developed, but oddly enough at the same time, the OIOS-IED deems the
implementation as partially implemented and closed.37
The second and third recommendations both address training completion, and were both
deemed to have been implemented. Challenges arising from the diverse backgrounds of
peacekeepers have been addressed within the newly implemented training in the form of an
individual training needs assessment. This assessment evaluates the background and knowledge
of trainees, allowing them to skip certain training material, however, there is no available data
showing what warrants trainees to be pardoned from certain activities. Because of this, it is not
possible to gauge whether or not the individual training assessment is beneficial, or if it adds to
the problem by creating a loophole for peacekeepers to avoid more training. Moreover, it is
stated in the third recommendation that the training is mandatory unless waived under
exceptional circumstances. This caveat poses another threat, making known that there is an
option, although rare, to circumvent the mandatory training requirement. The fact that
“mandatory” training can be waived is paradoxical, and it may allow trainees and TCCs to
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improperly use this exception by finding loopholes to opt out. Regardless of these feeble
directives, the evaluation shows that training regulation compliance has increased over the
three-year time period. 100% of newly appointed uniformed senior leaders as well as senior
appointees among police personnel had completed their mandatory training in 2017 and 2018.
The number of military personnel who met the mandatory requirements rose from 83% to 88%
between 2015 and 2016, and in the following year, 100% of military personnel completed the
required training—a major achievement. Regarding civilian appointees, the training completion
increased from 81% in 2015 to 91% in 2018. The report does, however, warn that these statistics
should be interpreted with caution due to the fact that there were only 63 new appointees
between 2015 and 2018. While it is important to heed these successes, one should keep in mind
that these results reflect the status of only the core peacekeeping leadership team, leaving out
senior leadership of special political missions as well as all other levels held within
peacekeeping.38 Therefore, despite the improvement shown above, it only represents a fraction of
peacekeeper training.
There is only one recommendation that was closed without implementation, and that is
the fourth recommendation, calling for the allocation of sufficient budgetary funds. The lack of
action is due to concerns regarding the influence of Member States on training course content
and the inability to acquire funds through other avenues. While this reason given for neglecting
this recommendation is plausible, it does not pardon the fact that an insufficient budget deeply
contributes to the inadequacies of peacekeeping training. As discussed in the first section of this
chapter, funding for peacekeeping training is selective and difficult to obtain as it is often left to
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rely on extra-budgetary resources. A factor of this significance should not be easily brushed
under the rug.39
The fifth recommendation, along with the remaining two recommendations, focuses on
the contents of the course material. This recommendation called for the establishment of
performance indicators and targets for SML training. One of the established targets is to increase
participation in the SML course, and more specifically, to achieve gender balance amongst
participants. The OIOS-IED does note an increase in female participants in the three-year period,
but this concerned only the civilian component as the military component remained primarily
male-dominated. The difficulty in attaining gender parity among senior leaders is acknowledged,
and the report calls for a proactive approach to be taken, and stresses that this objective also
relies on nominations by Member States. The OIOS gives a good amount of challenges that
prevent them from implementing this recommendation, however, the recommendation is claimed
to be successfully implemented.
Recommendation six addresses the need for must-read documents and mission-specific
handbooks based on the feedback that relayed an information overload and a lack of clarity on
directives. In order to tackle this recommendation, a USB data storage device containing
mission-specific documents is provided, as well as summaries for important documents. This
recommendation was deemed implemented while bringing attention to the fact that the extent of
information overload reduction is outside the scope of this review. Finally, recommendation
seven, which calls for mission-specific and team-based tabletop exercises, has been claimed as
implemented. Tabletop exercises have been coordinated on topics such as crisis management and
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the protection of civilians in all larger missions including MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSTAH,
and MINUSMA in 2018 and 2019. 40
While most of these recommendations are deemed as implemented by the OIOS, the
report lacks sufficient evidence and does not adequately reflect the whole of peacekeeping
training as only core senior leadership is observed. The language used by the OIOS-IED is very
general and a tad controversial, as seen in the fifth recommendation. Additionally, while this
report addresses topics of significance, there are a few challenge areas that remain neglected by
the existing literature on peacekeeping training and the protection of civilians. By conducting
interviews with UN personnel in the field as well as staff at UNHQ that contribute to this area
firsthand, I will fill in the gaps in order to address these forgotten factors.
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Chapter 5: Recommendations
I. Overview
The interviews with UN personnel encompass four major challenge areas that should be
directly and more effectively addressed in peacekeeping training in order to ameliorate the
protection of civilians. By analyzing the information collected from these insightful talks, we can
prudently conclude that: first, the Security Council has fallen short in regards to the
operationalization and prioritization of POC; second, TCCs have been negligent towards certain
aspects of training; third, peace operations lack in-field implementations that supplement
pre-deployment training; and last, but certainly not least, uniformed personnel are not properly
equipped with the knowledge and means to maintain a state of psychological well-being. These
four challenge areas will be addressed in the following recommendations.
II. The Responsibility of the UN
While we are able to observe literature regarding the disparity between the POC mandate
and its implementation, the participants in this study provided valuable, firsthand perspectives on
the matter. It was encouraging to hear a general amount of progress towards the protection of
civilians. A Communications and Public Information Officer provided that POC is successful in
about 70% of missions, and that it is improving as different entities within the UN are starting to
work together in the field.41 While this is true, other participants identified challenging areas for
enhancing the effectiveness of POC. Due to accounts of unrealistic expectations from the
Security Council, some argued that POC mandates should be more realistic. This should be done
in order to ensure that the Council’s expectations are met and that the proper resources are given
for the implementation of POC in the field.42
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The common misconception of POC contributes to this struggle of mandate
implementation. Some participants have expressed the lack of clarity within POC mandates, and
even the ambivalence of POCs definition throughout its development. By observing more recent
literature, we can identify the relatively new derogatory term “Christmas Tree Mandates” used
amongst UN personnel. This piece of jargon refers to operations that end up reflecting the
agendas of various actors involved in mandate negotiations, and in turn, result in missions that
are overburdened with a manifold of tasks. Christmas Tree Mandates are evident when
comparing the Cold War era UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus with the more recent UN
Mission in the Central African Republic. The mission in Cyprus was given two main tasks, while
the mission in the Central African Republic was expanded with the responsibility of six diverse
tasks.43 With an ambiguous and overwhelming set of mandates, the true representation of POC
has been blurred into a false, all-encompassing approach. According to one participant, the aim
of POC is to help locals protect themselves rather than troops providing that protection for them.
Furthermore, “Presence, Posture, and Profile is all part of the POC profile.”44
In addition, a recurring underlying obstacle to the effectiveness of civilian protection is
the lack of resources. Specifically, a DPO Political Affairs Officer voiced that the main solution
lies in “better governance by political and economic actors of the host country,” especially
leading to a much needed boost in budgetary resources set aside for POC.45 Recalling the
previous discussion regarding lack of funds in Chapter 4, his stance is well supported and should
be acted upon. Some literature points to the Council’s hesitance to expand the scope of the UN’s
activity, especially when it comes to the consequence of further cost increases.46 This facilitates
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the idea that a reduced number of missions may allow for a more fruitful budget within
concentrated missions. On the contrary, another interviewee prompted that a fewer number of
missions does not necessarily mean that more resources will be available. Member States
determine budgets for each mission, and generally do so regardless of the fluctuating number of
peace operations deployed across the globe.47 As a whole, the lack of resources is an
all-encompassing roadblock, and this will be evident in the remainder of this section, if not
already obvious in previous sections.
Action 1: The UN training material must alter its language regarding civilian protection.
The focus of training needs to shift from the use of military power to the protection of
civilians. Training material should involve a focus on POC which will lead to a more effective
application of this in the field and a decrease of civilian casualties. Shifting the focus to POC
should incorporate attention to factors such as community engagement and negotiation tactics
rather than resorting to forceful means. The DPO must issue an updated set of standardized
training material in order to make this a priority, as it is mandated.
Action 2: POC mandates given by the UN must be practical in implementation.
The Security Council for too long has provided troops with unrealistic expectations when
it comes to POC policies in the field, and this is supported through existing literature and the
conducted interviews. These sources express how impractical developments from the Security
Council more often than not lead to a capability gap. In order for POC to be effectively
mobilized in the field, UN policy guidelines must be relevant and attainable.48 This can be
addressed by constantly adapting POC training material to the specific situation in the concerned
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country. This would in turn contribute to a better implementation of the mandate provided by the
Council.
Action 3: The UN must provide peace operations with adequate resources.
The need for resources in terms of training is exceedingly evident in existing academic
literature and UN reports, notably the OIOS audit analyzed earlier. As discussed, the OIOS
called for the allocation of sufficient budgetary funds, but later did not implement this because of
concerns regarding Member State influence in shaping the content of the courses. Moreover, this
problem had been previously acknowledged in 2007 when the C-34 requested funding proposals
from the Secretary-General to address this funding issue, however, no proposal was ever
submitted.49 The UN must encourage its members to express more value and investment in
peacekeeping training as well as developments in the field as discussed above in order to
improve POC. The UN must also hold POC as a priority when allocating funds. This
recommendation is deeply significant because it is, in one way or another, a mitigating
circumstance to each factor discussed in this paper. As the DPO Political Affairs Officer wisely
voiced, the main solution to these issues lies within the capability and willingness of national,
political, and economic actors to assist in this endeavor.50
III. The Responsibility of National Actors
As put by one participant, “in order to protect civilians, you need to communicate with
them and earn their trust,” and that trust is difficult to earn “if troops can’t speak the language
and are from a totally different culture.”51 Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are low-cost, small-scale
projects that are designed to respond to a wide range of needs expressed by surrounding
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communities that largely aid in this endeavor. They are usually taken up by local actors such as
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local authorities, and grassroots organizations. Some
projects that have been organized include refurbishing schools, teaching locals to make soaps,
distributing essential living items, teaching locals to make masks (in response to the COVID-19
pandemic), and constructing solar-powered water systems.52 Some QIPs can be as simple and
lighthearted as peacekeepers playing sports games and organizing markets and workshops with
locals, as recounted in a few interviews. These events provide a unique way for peacekeepers to
familiarize themselves with the culture that they are in and to facilitate a positive relationship
with civilians.
In addition to in-field activities, one participant expressed some pre-deployment training
commitment to cultural awareness and language understanding. In writing on pre-deployment
training, he relayed that “in addition to culture, they learn a few basic phrases of the language
which is a big help.” While this is recognized, the same participant admitted that there is still a
need for better language training for peacekeepers.53 Another interviewee related that
peacekeepers do not necessarily have the proper cultural knowledge and sensitivities to be able
to interact with locals. This is mainly because their training is very general. The interviewee did
point out that this shortcoming is starting to be recognized and more mission-specific training is
starting to be implemented, and TCCs should be encouraged to enter the field with the right
language skills. In order to compensate for this lack of cultural knowledge, a number of
Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) have been placed in the field to act as a link between
locals and peacekeepers. While CLAs act as a direct line of communication, this same
interviewee stated, though, that CLAs and other language assistants are not always enough. Not
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all mission units have CLAs in the field, and that is a big problem when it comes to effectively
interacting with the local community. She suggested that CLAs should be deployed in all
military bases.54 Another participant also endorsed a more extensive and broader implementation
of CLAs, but more specifically, more female-identifying CLAs. Because of the unfortunate
reality of a wide local mistrust of men in uniform, an equally gendered unit might aid in
facilitating a positive connection with locals. He gave the example of female peacekeepers
performing joint projects with local women, which is unmistakably a stride in the right direction.
This same participant also suggested the establishment of a community alert network, utilizing
CLAs so that locals can alert peacekeepers more easily in the event of possible trouble.55
While suggestions lay out a number of insightful propositions for the prevention of
misconduct, they all underline the need to improve the situation in the field through training. As
one interviewee expressed, when misconduct cases continue to take place in the field, revisions
must be made to the way in which peacekeepers are trained. This includes taking more invested
and personal-level approaches in material delivery as well as a variety of training methods. The
same interviewee stated that the problem with training is that it can consist of extensive
classroom PowerPoints and policies that peacekeepers need to read and memorize. This is not
practical, therefore more hands-on training, even in pre-deployment settings, would be
desirable.56 In regards to training containing more invested approaches, a former Senior Gender
Advisor suggested that training sessions should go deeper on a personal level. There should be
real conversations about consequences of SEA on local victims and communities as well as what
it means for those found guilty of violations. This type of deeper discussion and understanding of
misconduct can allow troops to personally discern when and how to positively engage with the
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community rather than having the constant fear of getting into trouble when near locals. Another
suggestion made was to develop video interviews of survivors of SEA so that peacekeepers can
see the impact. Bringing things to a personal level through implementations like these, especially
from the outset of training, may significantly shift the atmosphere of peacekeeping training for
the better. As the former Senior Gender Advisor put it, “prevention is so important from the
get-go,” therefore, policies and guidelines should be properly addressed and made very clear
from the beginning.57
Action 1: TCCs need to ensure that all peacekeepers complete all of the required training
prior to deployment.
It is intolerable that a majority of peacekeepers have not completed the training material
that is deemed as required. It is even more appalling that a number of peacekeepers were not
effectively made aware of and invited to pre-deployment training.58 TCCs need to establish an
effective method of invitation to “mandatory” training sessions. Along with this, peacekeepers
must be provided adequate time and means of travel to attend and participate in these
much-needed training sessions. Most importantly, the troop-contributing countries that are
facilitating most of this training, need to hold peacekeepers accountable for training completion.
A sense of active enforcement towards the completion of the required pre-deployment training
must be implemented into the structure of peacekeeper recruitment and deployment. Required
training must be imposed to the point that, regardless of the situation, peacekeepers will be
prevented from being placed in the field if they have not completed all of the required training.
Action 2: The DPO must apply more mission-specific, hands-on, and personal-level training
material.
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Training has taken a one-size-fits-all approach, leading to the negligence of certain
training needs as spelled out below. Training material must be mission-specific in order to
properly prepare peacekeepers for the environment that they will be put in. Each mission
location is unique in factors such as culture, politics, social norms, and environment. With only
the basic information and tactics provided in pre-deployment training, peacekeepers are left to
exert a plethora of self-learning once they are put into the field. It is also difficult for personnel to
retain information when the majority of pre-deployment training relies on classroom lectures and
PowerPoint presentations. This calls for a more hands-on training approach so information can
be better retained and tailored to different learning styles. There is also a demand for training to
be brought to a more personal level. For example, training on the prevention of SEA needs to be
concurrent with community engagement training so that there is no confusion on how to
appropriately interact with locals in the field.
Action 3: TCCs must enhance guidelines for cultural awareness and language training.
Positive community engagement is a significant aspect of peace operations, however, the
lack of peacekeepers’ knowledge capacity surrounding the culture that they are put in serves to
hinder the extent to which this can be achieved. It is true that there are existing programs and
personnel meant to aid in the facilitation of this bond, however, these resources are limited and
inadequate, to say the least. Remaining realistic, it is apparent that the likelihood of the UN
hiring and deploying CLAs in every mission in proper accordance with the mission’s population
density is low. While the implementation of a sufficient number of CLAs in the field may grant a
solution, it is not in the UN’s current capacity to do so. Instead, TCCs need to seriously enhance
training guidelines in regards to cultural awareness and language learning. Troops must be able
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to earn the trust of the community, and that is difficult to achieve if they do not speak the
language or understand the culture.
IV. Field Implementation
In an endeavor to get firsthand and non-hypothetical answers, I asked interviewees their
thoughts on the causes of policy and human rights violations committed by peacekeepers, and if
this issue is improving. The DPO Political Affairs Officer pointed out that this is not always easy
to identify, as violations vary depending on the country, and judicial consequences are the
prerogative of the host state.59 It is important to keep in mind that there are different acts of
misconduct committed by UN personnel, and this topic area is not limited to Sexual Exploitation
and Assault (SEA). With this in mind, interviewees focused on SEA in addressing policy and
human rights violations. Overall, interviewees have expressed that the fight against SEA has
improved and is being taken seriously. One specifically conveyed that the UN provides outreach
to the community to provide awareness on how to report any acts of sexual violence that they
encounter. One way that this is done is through a system established by the UN called
Community-Based Complaint Mechanisms. This and other methods of outreach have helped to
enforce and prevent violations. The zero tolerance policy and related training on the ground
allows for strengthening the missions’ accountability when it comes to these issues. Currently, if
any UN personnel in the field is suspected of committing SEA, it can result in suspension, the
loss of one's job, and being blacklisted from any UN job.60
As to the causes of conduct and human rights violations by peacekeepers, there were a
few disparities in the responses the DPO Political Affairs Officer averred that these violations are
often born out of boredom combined with emergence of opportunity. In order to combat this, he
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suggested that peacekeepers should get more involved in activities like local construction tasks
to keep busy. He also relayed that football games between soldiers and local children have
proved to keep troops busy and out of trouble. In general, the DPO Political Affairs Officer
emphasized the need for discipline among troops, and believes that this lack of discipline deeply
contributes to instances of peacekeeper misbehavior.61 In relation to discipline, one suggested
that the accountability of senior leadership needs to be strengthened.62 He also encouraged the
more frequent use of internal recreational activities to keep peacekeepers busy and reduce the
opportunity for them to act up.63 This was supported by the fact that to occupy peacekeepers with
constructive and healthy activities, recreational facilities are set up, however, they need to be
enhanced in many cases (notably the DRC, Haiti, and Liberia).64 Another interviewee claimed
that boredom is not the reason for peacekeepers to commit violations. Rather, it is the lack of
support and the complicated conditions in which they are put in that more or less leads them to
infringe.65 One participant conveyed that SEA cases that are most prevalent in military units that
are not effectively led and administered (on the local and national level), show low morale and
the feeling of the job not being worthwhile for peacekeepers. This same participant recalls a case
where a unit had not been paid for several months.66 Additionally, the former Senior Gender
Advisor provided that another reason for violations is that things are sometimes not made clear
from the beginning.67 Another interviewee supported this by bringing up the guidelines given to
peacekeepers for the prevention of SEA. They are extensively told not to fraternize with the local
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population, but at the same time, they are also told to engage with the community. This
ambiguity of orders only adds to the plethora of stress that these troops endure.68
Action 1: Peacekeepers should be provided with more recreational activities in mission
locations that allow for a substantial amount of spare time.
This recommendation arose unprompted during the first two conducted interviews. In
these interviews, it was expressed that the amount of spare time that peacekeepers are given in
the field leads to boredom and often results in misconduct. To combat this, some participants
suggested enactments such as organizing more sports games and getting peacekeepers involved
in the building of local infrastructure.69 Providing healthy alternatives for peacekeepers to invest
their free time in will not only dampen the opportunities and occurrences of misconduct, but will
also benefit the mental health of peacekeepers by providing lighthearted and enjoyable
experiences in lieu of the high-stress environment.70 This suggestion should, however, be taken
in an ad hoc manner as not every mission location is faced with the problem of excessive free
time.
Action 2: The UN and TCCs must strive for gender balance among all levels of peace
operations.
While significant strides have been made for gender equality in regards to the UN as a
whole, there is still a great deal of opportunity for improvement in terms of peacekeeping
personnel. A gender balance can be found in a number of civilian components, however, most
military components are still majorly made up of male peacekeepers. The real difficulty lies in
getting Member States on the same page, as personnel selection relies on nominations from
national governments.
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V. Psychological Well-Being of Peacekeepers
Peacekeepers are separated from the life that they are familiar with, placed in high-stress
situations with no support system, and expected to fully perform the expected duties. As one
interviewee highlighted, they are sometimes, like in the case of the Central African Republic, left
alone in remote areas for years with no support whatsoever.71 A UNHQ Political Affairs Officer
offered that, while this is an issue, rotating troops between mission camp locations is beneficial
to ease any negative effects of isolation and psychological well-being.72 Another interviewee
provided that there is not much focus on mental health for uniformed personnel. She did relay
that staff counselors were deployed in peacekeeping missions, but stressed their limited number
and capacities.73 One also added that there are some stress counselors, but not in sufficient
numbers. Not only is the size of the existing counseling unit inadequate, but it is also usually
provided for only the civilian component in the field.74 One participant provided that the UN has
a package of benefits that includes things such as internet to communicate with home, satellite
television, gyms or other recreational resources, rest days, and rotations from remote sites.75 This
benefits package is meant to be provided by troop and police contributors, however, it is not
always applied fully or up to the appropriate standards.76
All of the interviewees stressed that there was no real talk about existing pre-deployment
psychological wellness and stress management training. The idea of direct attention to mental
health awareness and stress management in pre-deployment training was discussed in all but one
of the conducted interviews. During the interviews in which this was proposed, participants all
agreed that this addition to pre-deployment training would be helpful. For example, the DPO
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Political Affairs Officer expressed that there is a need for peacekeepers to have stress counselors,
but he also was concerned that peacekeepers may not want to admit to stress.77 Unfortunately,
there exists a long-standing false stigma that if one seeks mental health services or takes any
other steps to care for one’s psychological wellness, then that person is weak.78 On the contrary,
seeking help with mental health management shows a level of self-awareness and maturity in a
person. There were, however, slightly differing opinions on how this should be implemented.
While one participant agreed that implementing more mental health management material would
be helpful, he took a more ad hoc approach, seeing it “as a normal leadership task to prevent it
and then if discovered to access help.”79 This statement holds a lot of truth to it, but
unfortunately, it is not enough considering that mental health is not a small side task that can be
fully and effectively handled by leadership. The facilitation and management of psychological
wellness requires specialized resources, and having leadership prevent and manage stress should
only be supplementary. The mismanagement of the psychological wellness of peacekeepers has
spiraled past the point of leaving it in the hands of leadership to prevent, identify and ameliorate
the situation. One participant posed that this should not be left up to the Council, but it should be
a national responsibility for military components. He also suggested that the padre/priest double
up and take on the responsibility of the mental wellness of peacekeepers.80 One interviewee
pointed out that some TCCs lack the capacity or awareness for mental health resources. In her
view, this should become a mix of national and UN responsibility, as the UN is better equipped
to provide mental health support and networks of counselors while TCCs can utilize those
resources and bring their own approach to the table. This alleviates the difficulty of TCCs having
77

DPO Political Affairs Officer. POC in Peacekeeping Interview. May 3, 2021.
Razza, Namie Di. “Mental Health in UN Peace Operations: Addressing Stress, Trauma, and PTSD among Field
Personnel.” International Peace Institute (IPI), December 2020.
79
Director and Chief Trainer. POC in Peacekeeping Interview. June 8, 2021.
80
Director and Chief Trainer. POC in Peacekeeping Interview. June 8, 2021.
78

38
to seek out mental health professionals, especially those in which still do not widely recognize
this issue.81
Aside from placing counselors in the field, the enhancement of team-building exercises
was discussed. The fostering of genuine connections between peacekeepers can significantly
improve the mental health of those in the field. This creates a sense of camaraderie between
troops, and more importantly, it goes a long way when it comes to highly stressful and critical
situations where team members must be able to trust one another. One interviewee provided that
more team-building exercises should be integrated between different types of personnel. The
caveat, though, is that this would need to be done more regularly since most military and police
components rotate every six months. Regardless, it can be as simple as encouraging civilian staff
to visit and converse with military staff more in the field. The same interviewee suggested that
peacekeepers have small periods of time where they are removed from the field for training at
HQ.82 In a broader perspective, the DPO Political Affairs Officer brought attention to the career
development system in regards to both the civilian and military components. There is currently
little room for advancement between roles within the DPO, and this can leave personnel feeling
as if there is little purpose to excel in their role. Why should they care so much if they are stuck
in the same role with little room for promotion? He added that providing better pay for police
and military components may help, considering it would make the job more worthwhile.83 In any
case, peacekeepers need to be able to grow in terms of their career advancement and know that
their job is important to international peace as well as their own personal development, because
the alternative ends in burnout, apathy, and carelessness.
Action 1: The negative stigma surrounding mental health must be overcome.
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This stereotype that causes peacekeepers to feel embarrassed or weak when managing
their well-being is not helping and needs to be shattered. Emphasizing psychological wellness
from the very beginning of training, through training, and continuing in the field will aid in
ending this stigma. Mental health should be continuously implemented into training to the point
that it is positively normalized and that personnel are equipped with the appropriate knowledge
and resources to soundly take care of themselves. If this is not addressed by the UN and by TCCs
head-on from the beginning of training, psychological well-being implementations will not be
useful.
Action 2: The psychological well-being of uniformed personnel must be addressed in
training.
Beginning in pre-deployment training, there should be at least one session that solely
addresses mental health and stress management in the field. This can include factors such as
culture shock, carrying out duties under pressure, decision making, coping with distance from
home and loved ones, and witnessing difficult situations. Additionally, and in accordance with
feedback from the interviews, there should be mental health professionals implemented in the
field. This should not be done in an ad hoc manner, but rather, in the form of permanent team
members that regularly check in with peacekeepers. The implementation of more opportunities
for networking and team building as part of pre-deployment training would also improve the
psychological wellness of peacekeepers. This includes the need for sessions devoted to team
building and team bonding as well as further implementation of residential training. Applying
these recommendations will help to build a support system among peacekeepers, boosting
morale and creating a sense of camaraderie among troops, thus, creating the foundation for a
psychologically healthy work environment.
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VI. Conclusion
Since its inception in 1948, United Nations peacekeeping has made considerable
advances in international peace and security, however, it still has a long way to go especially in
regard to training implementation. To begin, the existing training material for UN peacekeepers
is heavily generalized and outdated. The protection of civilians is scarcely mentioned in training
material, and when it is, the concept is not prioritized.84 I have argued here that the protection of
civilians, while improved somewhat, is still very lacking in many ways. Evidence gathered here
shows, importantly, a rather frightening number of peacekeepers are placed into the field without
completing the required training material. There are also the issues of lack of adequate funding,
poor design in training as well as the lack of regard for the psychological well-being of
peacekeepers.85
Regardless of these long-standing issues, it is evident that the UN is making efforts to
facilitate solutions, especially through OIOS reviews. While observing the origin and
development of POC, we have found that, although it emerged in the late 1900s, the mandate has
not yet fully developed. It can be said that the POC mandate’s major flaw is its lack of clarity
which, in turn, leads to complications in translation into military action. There is also the
unresolved dilemma of the gap between the Security Council’s intention of protecting civilians
and its ability to practically communicate those intentions. The attention gained from this failure,
however, has called for the prioritization of POC which, in turn, assists in identifying areas of
potential improvement. Despite the growing attention to the protection of civilians and its
enhancement, there are still a few significant factors as confronted above that remain untouched
or inadequately addressed.
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In conducting interviews with personnel in the field of peacekeeping, I was able to relay
unique and new perspectives on POC and what needs to be done in order to alleviate the
situation. The insights gained from these interviews in addition to the material acquired from
secondary sources brings to the table that (1) the UN must take responsibility in terms of policy
practicality and resource allocation; (2) national actors must put more effort into their training
delivery; (3) programs and a more competent staff selection must be implemented in the field;
and (4) uniformed personnel must be equipped with the proper knowledge and means to maintain
a state of psychological well-being. More specifically, interviewees provided applicable
suggestions to ameliorate areas including the lack of cultural competency, peacekeeper
misconduct, high stress levels of peacekeepers, and mediocre community engagement. These
recommendations must be given serious consideration in order to advance the effectiveness of
POC.
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Annexes
Interview Questions
*Note that these questions only served as a blueprint. Interview questions varied between
participants due to varying insights and experiences.
Peacekeeper preparedness
Please describe your position and responsibilities. Did they include tasks related to the protection
of civilians? Spell them out please.
What are some challenges that you faced in protecting civilians? Can you give examples?
Can you describe your relationship with locals in the field?
Can you describe the relationship between peacekeepers and the local community?
Current/past peacekeeper preparedness/training
Can you tell me about the recruitment and training process pre-deployment?
How were you recruited/selected?
What did training material consist of?
Was training material effectively delivered?
Did your training include psychological wellness training?
Did your training include effective cultural awareness training?
Did your training include effective gender equality training?
Overall, how effective is training for this position, in your home country, and in the field?
To what extent do you think you were properly prepared to handle protection of civilians related
issues?
Recommendations
Are you of the view that the quality of training should be enhanced?
Do you think that the existing training makes a difference?
What do you think can be added to or taken away from training?
What do you think about deploying mental health counselors in the field for peacekeepers?
Do you think enhanced psychological/sociological/cultural training would benefit peacekeeping?
Are there any factors you think are not properly expressed that you would like to bring to light?
What is your overall conclusion/thought on the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping?
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Interviewees
I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

DPO Political Affairs Officer
A. Interviewed on 3 May 2021 by video conference
B. UN DPO Political Affairs Officer
1. DRC
2. Guinea-Bissau
Former Senior Gender Advisor
A. Interviewed on 6 May 2021 by video conference
B. Consultant to UN Women and the World Bank on gender equality and SEA
C. Former UN Peace Operations Senior Gender Advisor
1. Experience with MONUSCO
Communications and Public Information Officer
A. Interviewed on 26 May 2021 by video conference
B. Communications and Public Information Officer
1. South Sudan
2. Rwanda
Director and Chief Trainer
A. Interviewed on 8 June 2021 by email correspondence
B. Director and Chief Trainer for United States and United Kingdom government
programmes
1. Teaches POC in missions and TCCs
2. MINUSMA
3. MINUSCA
4. MONUSCO
5. UNIFIL
UNHQ Political Affairs Officer
A. Interviewed on 9 June 2021 by video conference
B. UNHQ Political Affairs Officer
1. IOT on MONUSCO
2. New York City headquarters
3. Regular trips to missions
a) Last trip to the DRC in 2019
POC Expert
A. Interviewed on 11 June 2021 by video conference
B. UN DPO Political Affairs Officer
1. MONUSCO
C. POC expert
1. Formerly in US-based think tank

